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Secondly, I am not convinced that on Aquinas's view the motives or signs
of credibility are as extrinsic to the act of faith (merely disposing one to be
attentive) as Jenkins' interpretation claims. He certainly is right in rejecting
the naturalist interpretation, but on Aquinas's view it seems that the light of
faith enables one to see or appreciate the signs of credibility themselves.
Jenkins is right that this often occurs by an immediate, non-discursive perception. But what one might perceive, by the light of faith, and one's free
will disposing one to see, is the sublin1ity of the teaching, or the miraculous
character of the liturgy or the life of the Church, or so on. In other words, the
signs of credibility themselves are either perceived in a certain way through
the light of faith, or obscured by one's pride or other vices.
Thirdly, while it is difficult to apply contemporary classifications to a
medieval thinker, still, I doubt that Aquinas can be categorized as neatly as
Jenkins does (following Eleanor Stump) as an externalist regarding epistemic warrant. I doubt this because Aquinas's notion of propositional
knowledge as a knowing that one knows, and thus as essentially reflexive,
seems to include in the completed act of knowing an implicit awareness of
the essential orientation (or design) of the intellectual act and of the intellect to truth (see, e.g., On Truth, Q. 1, article 9, Summa Theologiae, Pt I, Q. 16,
a.2). Awareness, on some level, of signs of credibility, while not the sole or
even the primary mover (motive) in the act of faith, do seem to play for
Aquinas an essential role in helping to assure the believer that his act is not
done lightly (leviter)-see Summa Theologiae, Pt. 11-11, q. 2, a. 9, ad 3).
This is a very worthwhile book. It accon1plishes many things, among
them, setting out an original interpretation of Aquinas's notion of sacra doctrina, or theology, and an interesting, provocative interpretation of hirn on
the light of faith. The book also bears witness to the tremendous wealth
and depth of Aquinas's work.

Faith and Understanding, by Paul Helm. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1997. Pp. viii, 212.
SANDRA MENSSEN, University of St. Thomas
This book examines and evaluates the relationship between faith and philosophy as that relationship is expressed in the tradition of "faith seeking
understanding." The first three chapters offer a general survey and exposition of the tradition. The last five chapters consider case-studies, particular
exemplificatiol1s of the tradition: Augustine's account in the Confessions of
time and creation, Anselm's understanding of faith and reason in the first
four chapters of the Proslogion, Anselm's ul1.derstanding of the incarnation,
Jonathan Edward's account of original sin, and John Calvin's notion of the

Sensus Divinitatis.
Heln1 holds, together with the classical proponents of the faith-seekingunderstanding tradition, that philosophy is a help-mate rather than an
enemy of faith. I am entirely in agreement with hirn here. In fact, the point
seems to me somewhat more obvious than Helm takes it to be. (Perhaps I
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underestimate the lure of fideism.) Still, Helm's emphasis on the complementary relationship between faith and reason is welcome.
The book has a number of attractive features. Helm's two-part division
of the text into theory and application seems a good way for a beginner to
approach the tradition of faith seeking understanding. Gf course, theory
can be - perhaps must be - extended through particular applications, but
general overviews help us get our bearings before enlbarking 011 particular
paths. And the particular paths Helm chooses to explore in the second part
of the book are thoughtfully chosen. Helm usefully emphasizes the diversity of tlle instantiations of "faith seeking U11derstandulg": he considers how
the tradition plays itself out not only in the examination of specific religious
doctrines, but also in reflection on Scriptural texts, and in metaphysical
reflections, and in reflections on particular thinkers in the Christian tradition. The book is carefully footnoted. Readers can follow up on a wide variety of intriguing analyses Helm cites, from texts of classical authors (such as
Augustine and Aquinas) to writings of leading contemporary analysts (e.g.,
Alston, Leftow, Plantinga, Stump, Swinburne, and Wolterstorff). And
while readers can research sources if they choose, there is an explicit and
refreshing insistence on examining not the historical provenance of ideas
and argunlents, but the ideas and arguments themselves.
The general overview of faith and understanding would, I think, be
strengthened by greater attention to definition and clarification. Consider,
for instance, Helm's introductory account of two notions of reason - substantive reason and procedural reason. The reader is expected gradually to
piece together definitions of the two sorts of reason on the basis of Helm's
comments. It is a lot harder work than it ought to be. This is partly the
consequence of some sloppiness in expression - for instance, substantive
reason is sonletimes spoken of as a set ofpropositions:
As we have just noticed 'reason' can be used as a nanle for a body of
propositions, a set of truths which are held to be self-evidently true,
or obviously true, or highly likely to be true, and on which all other
truth-claims, including religious truth-claims, must be based. (p. 5)
But Helm also describes substantive reason as a view about a set of proposi-

tions:
Let us call the view that there are such self-evide11t or highly likely or
obvious truths the substantive sense of reason. ... (p. 5)
The reader must not only mentally correct this sort of sloppiness, but
also disambiguate on occasions when the information necessary for disambiguation is not immediately at hand. Helm tells us aboLlt the first sort of
reason that
Wllat makes this use of reason substantive is that it is 11eld that by its
use alone we may gain knowledge about the world.... (p.6)
Does Helm mean here that though something other than substantive reason
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may give us knowledge about the world, we can get at least some knowledge solely through substantive reason? This interpretation does not seem
unreasonable. But Helm later rules it out, saying that "Any reasoning about
anything requires the acceptance, the use, of procedural reaSOIl" (p. 7).
Does the sentence at issue mean we cannot get knowledge of the world
unless we rely on substantive reason? I think we are supposed to opt for
this interpretation. We are supposed to see substantive reason as working
in tandem with procedural reason (th.e rules of deductive and inductive
logic): both are necessary for knowledge of the world, and neither is by
itself sufficient for complete knowledge of the world. But all this is much
less clear than it should be, particularly for an. introductory section of the
book intended to set up the framework of analysis for th.e rest of the work.
It seems to me that the best way of developing the concepts that will
frame analysis of the faith seeking understanding tradition is to offer
definitions that give us a tree of excluded middles. If one is concerned
to understand different senses of 'reason' it is extremely helpful to begin
by saying something like: "A commitment to reason either involves a
commitment to the view that there are self-evident truths, or it does
not." That is, either P or ,..,P. Then one can go on: if P, either Q or ""Q; if
Q, either R or ,..,R; etc. Such a taxonomy facilitates precise definitions of
different senses of reason, and helps us grasp logical relationships
among the different senses.
Helm's account of three different senses of faith also leaves me wanting a tree of excluded middles. The first view of faith, Helm says, is that
faith "is an evidential gap-bridger or make-weight"; on this view faith
exhibits a degree of certainty greater than the evidence warrants. The
second view (the "evidentialist" or "proportionalist" view) is that the
certainty of faith is proportional to the evidence. The third view is that
evidence is irrelevant to faith.
In developing his account of the first understanding of faith Helm
says that faith (on this account) has a certainty authorized by Christian
revelation "in. rather the way in which the expertise of a scientist warrants a layman's trust in some theory beyond the degree to which the
layman can understand it." But notice that the fact the layman cannot
understand the scientific theory does not mean he necessarily has a conviction or certainty about the theory that extends beyond the warrant of
the evidence. At least sometimes, when the layman understands the
nature of the scientific authority supporting the theory, he may appeal
to·the weight of that authority as fully warranting his (admittedly inexpert) conviction.
It seems possible for someone to have grounds for accepting Christian
revelation as a whole because the person has philosophical or historical
grounds for accepting a particular body proclaiming the revelation as
authoritative, and in that case the person may obtain warrant for individual propositions that are apart of Christian revelation. Among the
propositions believed in this manner may be the proposition "One ought
to believe Christian revelation whole-heartedly and unreservedly."l I
would describe such belief as belief in wh.ich the certainty of faith is proportional to the evidence in one sense, but not in another. The believer has
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evidence warranting resolute belief, but not purely philosophical or historical evidence, not evidence that avoids all appeal to religious authority, not evidence that yields knowledge. The certainty of such faith is not
the certainty one associates with knowledge.
Is it really important to draw this sort of distinction? I think so. By
way of illustration I will comment brieflyon Helm's discussion of
Norman Kretzmann's account of faith seeking understanding/ a discussion flawed, I think, by Helm's failure to draw the distinction I have just
mentioned. Helm takes Kretzmann to conceive of faith as exhibiting a
degree of certainty greater than the evidence warrants (i.e., Helm sees
Kretzmann as endorsing the first of the three accounts of faith). But if
"the evidence" that is relevant is allowed to include an appeal to authority, where there is philosophical evidence for accepting the authority in
question - where there is a case better than .5 that the alleged authority
is areal authority - then Kretzmann n1ight well say that the certainty of
faith is warranted by the evidence. If we are uncomfortable attaching to
Kretzmann (and the AugustiI1ian account he explicates) the label "evidentialist" or "proportionalist", then we need to give a more detailed
account of varieties of the first, non-evidentialist concept of faith, an
account that distinguishes between the view that the sum total of evidence does not warrant resolute belief, and the view that purely philosophical-historical evidence - evidence that at no point draws in an
appeal to authority - does 110t warrant resolute belief.
By noticing that evidence 0/ a sort supports the first kind of faith we
avoid some of the mistakes Helm seems to make in his commentary on
Kretzmann's Augustinian account of faith. After mentioning some of
the evidence Augustine and Bonaventure offer for the credibility of the
propositions of faith Heln1 writes that
There is little suggestion in Augustine and Anselm that the authority of the Church needs rational support to make it credible; rather
the reverse. Here, for example, is what Anselm says on tl1e matter:
"No Christian ought to debate whether something which the
Catholic Church believes with its heart and confesses with its
mouth is false .... " (p.42)
Whether or not Anselm thought that the authority of the Church should
be underwritten by rational support, the quotation fron1 Anselm does
not substantiate the view that rational support is unnecessary. The quotation is entirely consistent with thinking that because the Church's
authority is rationally established one should not debate Church teachings. And whether or not Augustine thought that the authority of the
Church needs rational support to make it credible, Kretzmann's lucid
and helpful expositiol1 of what he terms an Augustinian understanding
of faith seeking understanding clearly recognizes an inescapable need to
have grounds for accepting the Church's authority.
Attending to the existence of evidence for Church authority helps us
see that (contrary to Helm's claim) there is no "tension" between
Kretzmann's idea that understanding involves displaying the coherence
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of propositions and th.e rational grounds for them, and Kretzmann's
idea that there is a sense in which understanding can supplant faith.
Why would anyone think there is tension between these two ideas?
Perhaps Helm imagines Kretzmann to hold that philosophical understanding can completely supplant faith, and that unless understanding
supplants faith there is an unacceptable evidential gap for the believer.
(If Helm is not imagining this, then I do not know what he h.as in mind.)
But Kretzmann is quite clear that in the Augustinian picture of things
understanding will never completely supplan.t faith. "Propositional
understanding" supplants "propositional faith," to use Kretzmann's terminology - but propositional faith is not the only kind of faith. A
believer will always (at least in this lifetime) believe propositions that
are not grounded in purely philosophical arguments; philosophy cannot
carry us so far that we con1pletely dissolve aH of the mysteries of faith.
Nevertheless, there need not be an "evidential gap" that renders the
believer's faith irrational; evidence that the Church is the oracle of God
underwrites revealed propositions that lack purely philosophicaillnderpinnings.
Helm's critical discussion of Kretzmann seems to llndervalue or even
miss the fact that evidence of a sort may warrant resolute belief, wholehearted faith, and that the evidence may weH include warrant for the
authority of the Church. Now Kretzmanl1 is just one of many authors
Helm considers in the course of his book. And Helm's discussion of
Kretzmann is just a single example suggesting Helm's discussion is
flawed for want of developing a careful taxonomy (ideally a tree of
excluded middles) of accounts of faith. But it is an important example, I
think, because throughout Helm's book there seems to be a gen.eral
undervaluing of the existence and significance of evidence for faith. The
tradition of faith seeking understanding is quite compatible with
emphasizin.g evidence for faith (Kretzmann's discussion of Augustine
makes this clear). If the role evidence for faith plays in the faith-seekingunderstanding tradition is highlighted, the tradition becomes an important resource for non-believers interested in investigating and evaluating
the warrants for faith. Both believers and inquiring agnostics can learn
from the rich tradition Helm introduces in his book.
NOTES
1. See Thomas D. Sullivan, "Resolute Belief and the Problem of
Objectivity," in Linda Zagzebski, ed., Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to
Reformed Epistemology (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
1993), pp. 110 -139.
2. Helm's discussion focuses on Kretzmann's "Faitl1 Seeks,
Understanding Finds: Augustine's Charter for Christian Philosophy," in
Thomas P. Flint, ed., Christian Philosophy (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1990).

